From mid-1958 to mid-1960, Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Baines Johnson (LBJ) refused to acknowledge his candidacy for the 1960 Democratic presidential nomination. Party leaders had understood for some time that LBJ would pursue that last step in a political journey that he had begun in Texas in 1936. Robert Caro’s The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Passage to Power contains the details of numerous conversations between Johnson and various friends, political advisors, and Democratic legislators concerning his pursuit of that goal.

Sen. Johnson had talked about becoming President since he was a young man. At the 1956 Democratic convention, he refused to withdraw his last-minute candidacy, and only conceded defeat after receiving just 80 votes to nominee Adlai Stevenson’s 905 votes. Friends and foes alike fully expected him to pull out all the stops to win that nomination in 1960.

In mid-1958, Johnson’s advisors began laying out their plans for an aggressive two-year effort to court state and county political leaders (also potential convention delegates) in the northern and western states where that southern politician was not very well known. LBJ surprised them by not putting those plans into action. Indeed, he denied an interest in running at that time, asserting that he had to tend to the more important business of the U.S. Senate. To the surprise of the party professionals, Johnson publicly retained that posture throughout not only 1958 but also 1959. And he refused to enter any of the 16 primaries scheduled for 1960.

LBJ kept assuring his inner circle that he would formally announce his candidacy at the proper time; he was confident he would gain the party bosses’ endorsement after they saw the obvious weaknesses of all the other candidates. He rebuffed supporters’ requests to let them make his desires known, and did not allow surrogates to quietly sow his campaign’s seeds.

Meanwhile, beginning shortly after the 1956 election, one of those other candidates (Sen. John F. Kennedy) ran one of the most effective campaigns in history. By May 1960, when LBJ finally focused his efforts not on waiting to be drafted by a deadlocked convention, but on persuading the delegates to vote for him, it was too late. On July 13, Kennedy easily won the nomination on the first ballot.

What’s the Lesson?
One chief executive officer of a small, well-respected outsourcing firm is constantly asking me, “Did you find anyone who will pay me $XX million for my company?” I hope he understands how unlikely that is, particularly since he has never hired my firm to go look for a buyer.
Another likes to describe his ideas for expanding his outsourcing firm’s capabilities. But when discussing an exit strategy, he’s quick to say “We would accept a good offer right now.” If he’s conflicted on the decision to sell, and taking no steps to make his firm attractive to a buyer, how does he expect to attract that “good offer” any time soon?

Many CEOs of privately held companies are not sure if they want to sell. Sometimes, it’s possible to “test the market,” using a knowledgeable advisor to gauge the market’s appetite for the asset. Making such an effort still requires a commitment, if not an irrevocable one.

Other CEOs are pretty sure they want to sell their companies. But if they refuse to do the work required to go to the market, they might never appreciate the full extent of the market’s interest.
Still others definitely want to sell their companies. It’s tough to guarantee anything, but if they work with knowledgeable advisors, and take the right steps to attract a range of credible buyers, they usually can satisfy their desires.

LBJ definitely wanted his party’s 1960 Presidential nomination. But he emphatically refused to pro-actively seek that position. He even refused to let supporters or surrogates quietly make his true intentions known to the right people at the right time. When he finally changed course, it was too late. Take a cue from LBJ: decide whether you really want to sell; if you do, don’t delay in taking the steps necessary to accomplish that goal.